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THE WINDING UP OF A CORPORATION.
There is a great diversity of judicial
opinion as to the manner in which the affairs of a
corporation may be brought to a close,and the exis-
tence of the corporation terminated. There are
five ways which are coimonly recognized by the courts
for thi3 purpose.
rirst, by forfeiture of the corporate franchise by
the adjudication of a competent court.
Second, by the repeal of its charter under the
reserved power of the state.
Third,by the voluntary surrender of the franchises
by the stockholders.
Fourth,at the suit of the stockholders.
Fifth,the expiration of the time limited for its
existence by the charter. But this latter is more
properly treated under the head of 'ipso facto'forfeitvres
2The above classification will be of little
importance without the further consideration of the
different views with which the courts have regarded
cornorations to determine whether they come under any
of these five methods Then too we must study what
are the effects of an act of the legislature upon the
charter of the corporation,by which its existence is
sought to be ended. To fully understand these
effects,we must know what the nature of a charter is as
regards the legislatures of the various states.
In the famous Dartmouth College Case,the
United States Supreme Court b finally determined
that a charter is a contract between the state and the
shareholders of the corporation, and it cannot be alter-
ed by the state without the consent of the corporate
body unless the right to alter has been expressly re-
served to the state by the articles of incorporation.
The learned Chief Justice >. arshallwho delivered the
opinion of the court, said: "The opinion of the court
after mature deliberation is that this is a contract,the
obligations of which cannot be impaired without violat-
3ing the constitution of the United States"(Dartmouth
College v Woodward, 4 Wheat,518) .
Where there is a reservation of the right to
change or take away the charter by the legislature,then
it may do so(People v 0'Brion, 45 Hun 519; Erie R'y Co.
v Casey, 26 Pa. St. 287; McLaren v Pennington, 1 Pai ge
102) . And where the legislature reserved the
right to alter or repeal the charter on the happening
of a condition,it has been held that the legislature has
the power to decide whether that condition has happened
or not ,and the courts have nothing to say about it, in
Chase v Babcock, 23 Pick, 334,the court said in the
opinion: "We do not believe that the enquiry into the
affairs or defaults of a corporation with a view to
continue or discontinue it,is a judicial act". And
the following cases held the same(yrick v Brawley,33
Minn.377; Erie R'y Co. v Casey, supra;).
In Common=ealth v Lykens Water Co (110 Pa.
St. 391) where the statute expressly stated that unless
certain conditions such as constructing buildings etc.,
were performed within two years,that the franchises
shall revert to the state,it was hold that if the cor-
4poration failed to perform the conditions,then the re-
verter takes place ipso facto upcn the expiration of
the two years.
We have seen in the cases already cited when
the legislature can alter or repeal the charter of a
corporation without the aid of any court,but there are
cases -.-There the legislature cannot do this,and the rea-
son is becaase it would be depriving the corporation
of property without due process of lav which would be
unconstitutional. In all the cases which hold that
a corporation cannot be dissolved except by decree of
the court ,there was no express reservation in the char-
ter of the corporation,so it is safe to say that the
franchises of a corporation can be forfeited only by a
judicial decision,unless it is expressly stated in the
charter or enabling act that the legislature shall
have the power so to do. (For authority see the follow-
ing cases: State v Noyes, 47 Me. 189; Buffett v Great
Wes. R'y Co. 25 Ill. 353; Regents v Williams. 31 Am.
Dec. 72).
But the legislature always has the right to
appoint a trustee to take its assets and administer
them when a corporation has become dissolved in any way,
unless there is a statute restraining the legislature
from doing so,and if the legislature does not appoint
one,a court of equity will. In Lathrop v Stednan,
(13 Blach. 134),the United States Circuit Court said:
"The legislature h.s the right as an adrinistrative
measure ,to apnoint a trustee to take the assets and
manage the affairs of a cor'poration whose charter has
been repealed in conformity with the general just rules
which it has pi-escribed,or with the rules of a court
of equity if no% statutory provisions have been enact-
ed".
\'Then the le~r.slature grants certain franchises
to a corporation upon a condition subsequent,nanely,
that the corporation shall do a certain act within a
certain timeand the corporation fails to do itwhe-
ther such failure to perform causes a forfeiture of the
franchises,ipso facto ,is in much dispute. One class
of cases hold that if franchises are -iven to a corpor-
ation on condition that they do certain acts within a
certain time,and they fail to perform them,then the
franchises are ipso facto forfeited,and that no judi-
6cial act or any other is needed to complete the for-
feitur e.
Among the cases holding that a court of equi-
ty has no po-,rer to forfeit a charter of a corporation
for non-performance of its conditions is Elizabethtown
Gaslight Co. v Greene, (46 1. J. Eq. 118). The
court held that a court of equity has no authority in
virtue of its general jurisdiction to dissolve the
cornooation and deprive it of its franchises for non-
user or misuser of its coi-o'oate powers,nor becase it
was not organized in strict accordance with the require-
ments of the statute by which it was created but in
violation of them. In !"ational Docks R'y Co. v
Central R'y Co. (5 Eq. 755) ,T.r Justice Dixon
said: "That an enquiry .,Ihether a corporation exists de
jure or not is beyond the powers of the court of chan-
cery and that whenever it is sought to impugn the le-
gality -,f the corporation which exists undei' the fonms
of lmv ,the rer.edy is by quo warranto or information in
7the nature thereof instituted by the attorney general".
In Brooklyn Steam Transit Co. v The City of
Brooklyn (78 N. Y. 524), the facts were as follows:
The plaintiff was incorporated under the laws of New
York State with authority to construct an underground
and elevated railroad in the streets of Brooklyn, and
the act provided that unless said company be organized
and at least one mile of such railroad as it is author-
ized and enpowered to construct under this act,be laid
within three years thereafter,then and in that case,
this act and all the powers,rights and franchises herein
and hereby granted shall be deemed forfeited and ter-
minated" . About two years later another act was
passed which extended the time for constructing the one
mile of track to the 4th. day of July, 1876. From
the time of its organization it kept an office and
transacted business but it did not build or lay any
portion of its railroad until June ,1878,when it built
a mile of track outside of the City of Brooklyn and
about the same time it commnced to lay down certain
8foundations for an elevated railroad within the city
lirts ,and it was prevented from proceeding further by
the defendant. The defence was that the plaintiff
lost its corporate existence by not building one mile of
its road before the expiration of the time limited,to
wit,July 4th.,1876 . In this suit to restrain the
defendants from interfering with the plaintiff in the
construction of its road,the question to be decided is
,:hether the plaintiff's corporate existence had been
forfeited ipso facto in not constructing the one mile
of road before July 4th. 1876, and the court held that
upon the failure of the plaintiff to construct the one
mile of road on or before July 4th.,1376, the corpor-
ation came to an end,as if that were the time limited
in its charter for the corporate existence.
Among the cases which hold that the charter
of a corporation is not forfeited ipso facto without
some act of the state ,is Day et al v 0. & L. C. R'y Co.,
(107 7. Y. 129). In this case they distinguish Brook-
lyn Steam Transit Company v City of Brooklyn (supra)
and hold that unless the act has an express provision
to the effect that the charter will become void if
certain acts are not done ,that a non-compliance with
the act will not work a forfeiture,and Davis v Gray (16
Wall. 203) lays down the same doctrine.
But from a study of the cases it seems that
the weight of authority is that a corporation is not
di ssolved ipso facto for not complying with the con-
ditions laid down in its charter,but that it is simply
a cause of forfeiture ,'-hich the state may take advan-
tage of in a proceeding for that nurpose,and the fail-
ure of the corporation to comply with the conditions
must be judicially deterined.
In Tohaman v Binns (31 .1iss. 355) the rule
wias laid down that a corporation is regarded as in ex-
istence until a judgent of forfeiture has been pro-
nounced in a proceeding of quo warranto,and that a per-
son could not bring a suit on the ground that the cor-
poration was dissolved because of a misuser or non-
user, and the court while referring to the mis-user,
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said: "This may be a good cause of forfeiture,and a
court in a proper proceeding might declare a forfei-
ture of the franchisesbut until such judgment shall
be pronounced,the corporation mnust be regarded as still
in existence"
But the legislature of a state has the right
to pass a l= authorizing private persons to forfeit
charters by proceedings in a certain manner laid down
by the statute ,and Pennsylvania has a statute which au-
thorizes any private citizen by a bill in equity to com-
pel a corporation to show its authority to do a cer-
tain act. But in the case of the Western Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Company's Appeal (104 Pa. St. 399) it
was held that a private person could,by a bill in
equity, compel a corporation to show its authority to
do a particular act,but could not show the non-user of
a franchise in order to establish a forfeiture of the
charter of the corporation.
We have seen that as a general rule a for-
feiture of the charter of a corporation can be accom-
11
plished only by some act of the state ,and that in the
absence of a statute otherwise providing,the rightful
existence of the corporation is preserved for the pur-
poses of every collateral proceeding.
And now we will discuss briefly,some of the
grounds on which a state will forfeit a charter.
In reading the decisions of courts in ac-
tions brought to forfeit charters,it is seen that courts
are reluctant to cause a forfeiture if they can help
it, and this is especially true in corporations organ-
ized to carry on some public work.
In Moorc et al v the State, (71 Ind. 493) the
court said: "The rights,privileges and franchises of
such corporations (in this case a Turnpike Company),
we think,should not be declared forfeited,and they
should not be ousted and excluded therefrom except for
solid ,oighty and cogent reasons,for the violation of
a positive and prohibitory statute ,and not of a statute
whose provisions are permissions and apparently direc-
tory, and never upon merely technical grounds".
It seems that, as a general rule, a charter
will not be forfeited unless the public has an inter-
est in the act done or omitted,and the nis-user or
non-user of the franchises was wilfull or intentional.
(For authority for the above rule,see note in 22 Abb.
New. Cases, 210; Denet v Taylor, 9 Cranch, 45; People
vs N. R. S. R. Co., 121 N. Y. 132). In the last
case Judge Finch,in giving the opinion,said: "It ap-
pears to be settled that the state as prosecutor must
shoi on the part of the corporation accused some sin
against the I=w of its being which has produced or
tends to produce injury to the public. The trans-
gression must not be merely formal or incidental,but
material and serious,and such as to harm or menace the
public's wellfare".
Chapter II.
Ipso facto forfeiture of
Charter.
Under this head wi 1) be shown the manner in
which a corporation may be dissolved other than by an
act of the legislature or by a judgrent of the court.
When the charter of a corporation expresses a certain
number of years of dnration,and that time ends ,the
corporation is ipso facto dissolved,without any act
of the state ,and it has no ri-it to do any more busi-
ness as a corporation(Peorle v Anderson etc., Valley
Road Co., 76 Cal. 190; LeGrange etc., R. Co., v Rainey,
7 Cald. 420).
Some text writers la down the rule that a
corporation is dissolved by the death of all its mem-
bers, but the cases do not appe-r to follow such a rule.
The weight of authority seems to be that the
le ,r title in a corporation remains notwithstanding
14
the members change, and if all the members die at the
smne time ,the stock of each member would pass to his
representatives ,and they would have authority to carry
on the business of the corporation,and there would be
no dissolution.(Russell v !IcLellan, 14 Picl. 63).
) 15
Chapter III.
Voluntary Dissolution.
Where a corporation which owes some duty to
the public, surrenders its franchises, there must be
an acceptance of them by the state, or there -ill be no
dissolution,bec se a charter is a contract and there
must be the same kind of an agreement by the parties to
dissolve as there was to form the contract(The Boston
Glass Mfg. Co.,v Langdon, 24 Pick, 49).
But according to the modern decision, there
need be no acceptance by the state in private corpor-
ations although the old decisions held the contrary,and
the reason for it was because a dissolution extinguish-
ed the debts of the corporation,and it would be a bad
rule to allow a corporation,when it became heavily in-
debted,to surrender its franchises,and in that way get
out of paying its just debts. But now it is a well
16
settled rule that dissolution does not extinguish the
debts of a corporationand so that old reason why a
state should accept the surrender of a charter,is done
away with,and now a strictly private corporation may
surrender its franchises and dissolve the cor-poration
without an acceptance by the state(Slee v Bloom,19
Johns. 456; McMann v orrison, 79 Am. Dec. 418).
We have just considered the voluntary disso-
lution of a corporation by a surrender of its franchises
and found that in a private corporation its franchises
may be surrendered without an accentance by the state.
We will next consider what anounts to a surrender of its
franchises.
Of course a formal act of the corporation
decla-ing a surrender and an acceptance of it by the
state,will always effect a dissolution,but it has been
held that other acts not amunting to a formal sur-
render,-w ere evidence of a surrender and dissolved the
corporation. In the State v Vincennes University,
5 Ind. 77, the court held that if a corporation ne-
17
glects for a long time to exercise its franchises,a
presumption of surrender arises,but this may be re-
buttedand was in this case. The same rule was
laid down in Union Agricultural Society v Gamble,(52
Iowa, 524).
It is substantially correct to say that when
a charter is granted to a body of men for the purpose
of organizing a corporation,and they neglect to accept
it within a reasonable time, it is evidence of a sur-
rcnder,and the franchises canrot be renewed without a
new expression of the will of the legislature. (The
S tate v Bull, 16 Conn. 179).
We will next discuss wzhether a corporation
may be dissolved by vote of the majority of its share-
holders ,or whether there must be a unanimous vote.
There is a conflict of law on this question,some courts
holding that a corporation may be dissolved by a major-
ity vote, while others hold that there must be a unan-
imous vote. In Polar Star Lodge ,No. 1 vsPolar
Star Lodge,No. 2,(16 La. An. 53), the facts were as
18
follows: Plaintiff Lodge 'Jo. I was organized and was
carried on in the state of Louisiana for quite a con-
siderable timebut at one of their meetings a majority
of the members voted to surrender their charter against
the wishes of the minority, and the charter was subse-
quently surrendered,and the seceding majority formed
Lodge No. 2 and transferred the property of Lodge No.
1 to the new lodge. Now the plaintiffs,who were the
minority of Lodge No. 1, bring this suit to have their
charter given back to them so the:, can get possession
of the property of the Lodge which had been transferrcd
to Lodge No. 2, and it was held that the transfer was
void and that Lodge Yo. I could recover its property.
The court in the opinion said: "There is no doubt of the
right of individual members to withdraw themselves from
the lodge. And doubtless the whole of the members
might do the same thing by their unanimous resolution.
But so long as a sufficient number* of members to re-
present and continue the corporation,exist,it does not
appear to us to be within the power of the majority to
dissolve the corporation. They may dissolve their
own connection :rith it, but they cannot prejudice the
vested rights of their co-corporators by any act for-
eign to the objects of the corporation" . Revere vs
The Boston Copper Conpany (15 Pick. 351) held the same
as the above case. In this case the plaintiff con-
tracted with the corporation to do certain work during
the time for which the corporation was established. Sub
sequently by a majority vote, the directors were au-
thorized to sell the property and wind up the business
which they did, and they discharg-ed the plaintiff. The
plaintiff brings this action to recover damages for the
discharge, claiming that the corporation was not dis-
solved by a majority vote, and that it is still liable
on the contract until it is legally dissolved. The
court held that there must be a unanimous v,,te in order
to dissolve, and in this case there was not a dissolu-
tion, and therefore the corporation was liable to the
plaintiff.
Among the other class of cases which hold
20
that a corporation may be dissolved by a majority vote.
of the shareholders, is Treadwell v Salisbury 11fg.
Co., 7 Gray, 393, which was a case where a majority of
the shareholders voted to wind up the corporation and
sell the corporate property. The minority brought a
suit in equity to restrain them from selling the pro-
perty, but the court held that a corporation establish-
ed for trading and manufacturing purposes, has the right,
if it is deemed expedient by a majority of the stock-
holders, to wind un the affairs and close the business.
There are many exceptions to this latter rule owing to
the purposes for which some corporations are created,
and in which they bwe some duty to the public, such as
railway, canal and turnpike corporations, but in a pri-
vate corporation,created for trading pur-cses,the bet-
ter rule seems to be that a majority of the sharehold-
ers may, by vote, dissolve the corporation.
Chapter IV.
Winding up at the Suit of Stockholders.
A corporation may be wound up by a suit brought
by shareholders. Many of the states have statutes
which regulate this ind of proceeding. In West
Virginia, there is a statute which enables a majority
of the shareholders of a corporation to wind up the
business, but in Hurst v Coe,(30 W. Va. 158), the rule
is laid down that although it is competent for a ma-
jority in interest of the shareholders to discontinue
the business of the corporation, yet a statutory pro-
ceeding for dissolution cannot be had at the instance
of a mrjority .-fithout a showing of good cause therefor.
But in Oilvie v Attrill (105 U. S. 605) a rule was
laid down which is directly opposite to the one just
stated, and Mr. Justice Field said in the opinion,that
the court will not examine into the affairs of the cor-
poration to determine the expediency of its action,or
22
the motives for it, 1hen the action itself is lTful.
But a corporati on wi 11 not be di s solved at the
suit of a single stockholder sin-ly because the offi-
cers of the corporation have refused to let the share-
holder inspect its books,and that it is carrying on a
losing business. In a recent case in England,it
was held that where a corporation was established for
the purpose of carrying on a banking business,and then
abandoned that business and went into land spcculation4
-VX x ultra vires, the shareholders need not bring
an action to restrain the corporation froi.M doing it,
but may bring an action to wind up the corporation.(Re'
Crown Bank, 44 Ch. D. 634).
In many of our states there are statutes which
enable a court of equity to 7-ind up a corporation at
the suit of a stockholder, but as a general rule,un-
less a statute has given a court of equity this power,
it has no jurisdiction to dissolve the cor7oration dur-
ing its life, but this statement is not to be confused
with the jurisdiction of a court of equity to appoint a
receiver and close up the business of a corporation
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when its charter has expired, or when it has forfeited
its franchises by reason of non-user, but no final
settlement between a corporation and its ::-ebers on the
closing up of its business is valid as against credi-
tors unless they are parties to the proceeding.
Chapter V.
The Effects of a Dissolution.
We have seen the ways in which a corporation
may be dissolved and the business wound up, and now we
will consider what the effects of a dissolution is upon
the corporation, and on persons who are connected with
it in any way. We ,rill first see how the disso-
lution of a corporation was treated at common law.
At cornmon law the effect of a dissolution was
to put an end to its existence for all purposes. It
could not sue, neither could it be sued, and all actions
by or against it abated, and all the real property be-
longing to the corporation went to the grantors and
the personal property went to the state. But now,
since equity has come in, the property does not revert
to the state but is held as a trust fund for the bene-
fit of the creditors and shareholders. After a cor-
poratirn is dissolved it has no power to make contracts
25
which .ill bind its assets, but the corporation in such
a case must be dissolved de jure and not merely de
facto. In regard to its capacity to sue after dis-
solution, it has no power to sue in its corporate name,
but at present equity will appoint a trustee to collect
all debts owing to it, and such money, when collected,
,ill go to the creditors of the corr-oration if there
are any. In the modern law equity regards all assets
and claims of the corroration as a trust fund for the
benefit of the creditor, and it is a well settled rule
that equity will not see a trust fail for want of a
trustee, so the court will appoint a receiver to settle
up all the affairs of the corporation, and although a
corporation cannot be sued after dissolution, and all
actions against it abate, yet equity will compel the
assignee to distribute all its assets among the cre-
ditors according to their just claims.
The above rule does not apply where there
is a statute which authorizes a continuation of the suit
already begun against the corporation in the corporate
26
name. From the above doctrine it necessarily fol-
lows that in the absence of a saving statute, any at-
taclmtnent which has been levied upon pro-erty, and the
attachment suit has not yet come to juc.ient, ,ill be
abated by a dissolution of the corporation, and it has
been held at coiemon l= that if a corporation was dis-
solved after it had obtained judgment, it could not issue
execution on the judgment in its own name(May v State
Bank of N. C. 40 A. Dec. 726). At coamion law if a
corporation was dissolved, debts owing to it were extin-
guished, and a stockholder was not liable to pay calls
on the shares for which he had subscribed.
We have seen what the effects at cormmon l=w
were upon a corporation when it became dissolved. Now
--!e will consider some of the changes which have come
about in the modern decisions on this subject. At
present the obligations of the cor-orat ion survive
against its assets, and instead of allowing a corporation
to get away from its obligations when it is dissolved,
as at com.rion law, it holds its assets fo - the payment
of its debts as has already been stated,by means of
trustees appointed by a court of equity, and all the
assets are considered a trust fund for the benefit of
the creditors and shareholders, so by this doctrine,a
corporation cannot by dissolving itself, defeat the
rights of its creditors because the cornoration will be
considered to be in existence for them to recover their
claims, and in many of the states there are statutes
which continue corporations for the purpose of suing
or being sued for a certain period beyond the time of
di sso luti on.
With respect to the effect of dissolution on
an executory contract, of course a dissolution ",ill
relieve the corproation from any further liability, but
it will be liable for the dw .age incurred in the breach
of contract. 3oIle writers lay down the rule that a
statute authorizing the corporation to surrender its
charter, and be dissolved, is infringing the obligations
of the contract subsisting between the corporation and
third persons, but this is not the case, because a per-
son who contracts with a corporation is supposed to know
the liability of the corporation, and his rights against
28
it upon its dissolution-(People v 0' rion, II l . Y. 1).
As to when the dissolution of a corroration
takes effect: in Crease v Babcock (23 Pick. 334) the
rule is laid down that when the legislature repeals
a charter the corporation is dissolved as soon as the
act takes effect. When "- cornoration is dissolved
by court, the dissolution takes effect as soon as the
decree of dissolution has been entered.
